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In this paper, we view health insurance as a combined hedge
against the two consequences of falling ill: treatment expenditures and
loss in income. We discuss how an individual’s ability when healthy af-
fects her decision on whether to buy health insurance with treatment
to full recovery if ill or with partial treatment combined with cash
compensation for the resulting loss in income. We …nd that a high-
ability individual demands full recovery and is fully insured, while a
low-ability individual demands partial treatment and cash compensa-
tion and is only partly insured.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Individuals face an inevitable risk of falling ill, thus su¤ering a loss in health.
Health insurance provides a hedge against the consequences of falling ill. Like
most types of insurance, it o¤ers compensation to the insured if the insured-
against event occurs. Unlike most insurance, however, the compensation may
take two distinctly di¤erent forms: The health insurance policy may either
provide for coverage of medical expenditures (in part or in whole), or it may
provide for a cash compensation of income loss caused by illness.
This aspect of health insurance has interesting implications. We present
here a simple model in which an individual’s need to hedge against the risk
of losing health interacts with her need to hedge against the risk of losing
income due to (permanently) reduced health. This contrasts with discus-
sions of health insurance in the literature, such as Zeckhauser (1970), Pauly
(1971), and Zweifel and Breyer (1997), where only the risk of facing medical
expenditures is discussed.1 In the literature, the desire to restore health is,
by and large, taken for granted and the discussion instead centres on whether
or not the individual is fully insured against medical expenditures. This view
has been contested recently by authors like Byrne and Thompson (2000) and
Graboyes (2000), who argue that, when the probability of a successful treat-
ment is small, the insuree may be better o¤ with cash compensation if ill,
rather than going through the treatment. In this paper, we take side with
these authors in the view that cash compensation may be preferable. But
rather than a low probability of a successful treatment, it is an individual’s
low productivity when healthy that makes her, in our analysis, prefer a health
insurance with a cash-compensation component. Thus, we integrate what is
often thought to be a ‘typical’ health insurance, a policy providing for med-
ical treatment2 (i.e., medical insurance), and a disability insurance, a policy
providing for compensation of income loss due to (permanent) reduced work
ability. We consequently broaden the concept of health insurance in that we
include not only a medical insurance but also a disability insurance, both of
which insure against di¤erent consequences of the same risk, namely losing
1In fact, early writers like Arrow (1963), Zeckhauser (1970), and Pauly (1971) used
the term medical insurance to describe what today in common parlance is called health
insurance.
2For instance, reimbursing actual expenditures on medical treatment, or providing
medical treatment directly (e.g. supplied by health personnel contracted with or employed
by the insurance company).
2health. In other words, we bundle the risk of facing medical expenditures
and the risk of losing income, arguing that falling ill is the fundamental risk.3
Even though textbook discussions of health insurance seem to overlook
the distinction between the two ways of compensating an ill insuree, many
real-life health care systems do o¤er citizens a combination of treatment (i.e.,
health care) and cash compensation (i.e., disability payment). This is par-
ticularly prevalent in European countries, where health care and disability
insurance are mostly publicly provided, or at least publicly regulated, with
redistributional ambitions. In the US, a public health-insurance program
(Medicaid) and a public disability-insurance scheme (social security disabil-
ity insurance) are provided to low-income individuals. We show that this
combination of medical treatment and cash compensation is not intrinsic to
a public health-care system but would also grow out of a totally unregulated
system.
In this paper, we are concerned with how the individual’s choice among
di¤erent insurance contracts, o¤ering various degree of health restoration and
cash compensation, depends on her ability to earn income, i.e., her produc-
tivity. We develop our model in Section 2 and provide a preliminary analysis
in Section 3. The individual’s ex ante choice between the di¤erent types of
insurance contracts is derived. Three types of contracts are available to the
individual; a contract that indemni…es (i) medical expenditures, (ii) income
loss due to reduced health, and (iii) a combination of the two. A key aspect of
our model is that the cost of treatment is independent of the individual’s abil-
ity, but rather depends on the fraction of health, and therefore the fraction
of ability, that treatment restores. It is assumed that it is possible to fully
recover from an illness if the individual receives the appropriate treatment.
Our main …ndings are derived in Section 4. We show that the individual
buys di¤erent types of contracts depending on her ability when healthy. The
intuition for our results is that the cost-bene…t ratio of treatment is decreasing
in the individual’s ability if healthy. Hence, for a su¢ciently high level of
ability, the individual buys an insurance contract entitling her to complete
restoration of health and no cash compensation if she falls ill, i.e., a contract
of type (i). On the other hand, for a su¢ciently low level of ability when
healthy, the individual buys a contract that provides her with some treatment
3An account of the literature on the economics of disability is in Haveman and Wolfe
(2000). There is, however, little discussion in there of the present integrative approach to
medical and disability insurance.
3and some cash compensation if she falls ill, i.e., a contract of type (iii). She
consequently chooses not to fully restore health if ill, but rather to be partly
compensated for the loss in income due to reduced health. Since both health
and consumption are lower if ill, it follows that utility also is lower. In an
unregulated insurance market, therefore, an individual with a su¢ciently low
level of ability will insure only partly. In Section 5, we consider a special case
where the individual has Cobb-Douglas preferences. In a concluding Section
6, we discuss our results.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider an individual who has preferences over consumption, c; and health,
h. The individual faces exogenous uncertainty with respect to her state of
health. She may either be healthy, which corresponds to state 1, or she may
fall ill, which corresponds to state 2. The two states are mutually exclusive,
jointly exhaustive, and veri…able. In state 1, the level of health is normalized
to 1: h1 =1 . In state 2, the individual is ill and su¤ers a complete loss in
health. Health may, however, be restored (with certainty) if the individual
receives medical treatment: t,w h e r e0 · t · 1.T h u s , i n s t a t e 2 , t h e
individual may have a level of health equal to 1 if she receives treatment at a
level leading to complete recovery, i.e.,i ft =1 . If no treatment is received,
then t =0 , and health equals zero. Treatment leading to full recovery is
available at cost C, while treatment leading to partial recovery is available
at cost tC.4 Health in the case of partial recovery is measured by the fraction
of C that is spent on treatment: h2 = t. Consumption in the two states are
denoted c1 and c2, respectively.
The objective probability of falling ill is known to the individual and
given by ¼,w h e r e0 <¼<1. The individual seeks to maximize the von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
(1 ¡ ¼)u(c1;1) + ¼u(c2;t);
where u(c;h) is a Bernoulli utility function. We assume that u : <2
+ !<is
twice continuously di¤erentiable and satis…es: 8(c;h) 2< 2
++, uc > 0, uh > 0,
4The cost of curing an illness is assumed to depend on the characteristics of the illness,
rather than the characteristics of the individual su¤ering from it. Thus, since all individuals
face the same health risk, the cost of treatment is constant across individuals.
4ucc < 0, uhh < 0 and uch ¸ 0, where partial derivatives are denoted by
subscripts. In particular, u is strictly concave implying that the individual
is risk averse. Furthermore, uc(c;h) !1as c # 0 whenever h>0,a n d
uh(c;h) !1as h # 0 whenever c>0. Finally, uc(c;h) !1or uh(c;h) !
1 as c # 0 and h # 0.
There exists a competitive insurance market in which pro…t maximizing
insurers o¤er insurance at an actuarially fair premium. Information about
the individual’s probability of falling ill (¼), which disease she is su¤ering
from, and consequently, the associated costs of treatment, is symmetrically
distributed among the market participants. Health status is veri…able, and
insurance policies can be made contingent on it. The market for health
insurance will, therefore, be e¢cient.
The individual is assumed to earn income according to her level of income-
earning capacity, which we refer to as ‘ability’. If healthy, the individual’s
ability is equal to A, while if ill and treated at a rate t, her ability equals tA.
Ability is consequently proportional to health when ill. Note that the follow-
ing analysis does not require insurance companies to know the individual’s
ability when healthy; hence A may be private information.
The risk-averse individual wishes to insure against the consequences of
falling ill. Her insurance decision takes place prior to her knowing which
state of the world has occurred. Since insurance is o¤ered at an actuarially
fair premium, the individual’s budget constraint is given by:
(1 ¡ ¼)c1 + ¼(c2 + tC)=( 1¡ ¼)A + ¼tA
where c1 and c2 + tC are expenditures when healthy and ill, respectively,
while A and tA are disposable income when healthy and ill, respectively. It
is instructive in the context of the present paper to rearrange this budget
constraint and write it as follows:
A ¡ c1 = ¼[tC +( c2 ¡ tA + A ¡ c1)]
where (A¡c1) is the insurance premium, tC is the compensation in the form
of medical treatment, and (c2 ¡ tA + A ¡ c1) is the cash compensation.5
Make the following additional assumption on the utility function, u,
namely that the marginal willingness to pay for health, uh=uc, is not higher
if ill than if healthy, given that the expected cost of treatment is subtracted:
5Since the premium A ¡ c1 must be paid in both states, disposable income net of
the premium equals tA ¡ (A ¡ c1) if no cash compensation is received. Hence, the cash







This assumption means that, for a …xed relative price of health in terms of
consumption across states, the individual wants to shift the expected cost of
treatment towards the healthy state if treatment does not lead to complete
recovery (i.e.,i ft<1). A homothetic utility function satis…es this for any
non-negative expected cost of treatment, but the assumption is also satis…ed
by other demand systems.
In the following, we analyze how the individual’s insurance demand de-
pends on her level of ability when healthy, A. In particular, we study how
the decision on how to be compensated if ill depends on A: compensation
in the form of health restoration (i.e., treatment) and/or compensation of
income loss (i.e.,c a s h ) : We also study how the extent of insurance coverage
bought depends on A.
3 Preliminary analysis
As explained above, we assume that treatment leading to a health level t is
available at a cost tC when ill. For the purpose of our analysis, however, let
us be more general and ask what is the maximum utility achievable if the
individual has to pay P (¸ 0) for the treatment t:
U(t;P;A): =m a x
(c1;c2)
f(1 ¡ ¼)u(c1;1) + ¼u(c2;t)g
subject to (1 ¡ ¼)c1 + ¼(c2 + P)=( 1¡ ¼)A + ¼tA;
where U : <++ £ [0;(1=¼ ¡(1¡ t))A)£< ++ !< . The individual is o¤ered
a positive level of treatment, t, that may, for the purpose of de…ning and
analyzing the U function, exceed one. The maximum price she is able to pay
for this level of t is given by [1=¼ ¡ (1 ¡ t)]A.T h e p r i c e o f t r e a t m e n t , P,
will thus be somewhere between zero and this maximum price. Naturally, the
higher the level of ability when healthy, A, the higher the price the individual
can pay for treatment. Moreover, the higher the probability of falling ill, the
less the individual is able to pay for treatment.
To investigate the optimization problem, form the corresponding La-
grangian:
6L(c1;c 2;¸;t;P;A)=( 1 ¡ ¼)u(c1;1) + ¼u(c2;t)
+ ¸[(1 ¡ (1 ¡ t)¼)A ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)c1 ¡ ¼(c2 + P)]:
Given our assumptions on u, the …rst-order necessary conditions (FOCs) give





uc(c1(t;P;A);1) = uc(c2(t;P;A);t)=¸ (2)
and the budget constraint. Optimal consumption in each of the two states of
the world is a function of treatment (i.e., the degree of recovery in state 2),
price of treatment (P), and income (A), as shown above. Equation (2) follows
from the FOCs and implies that, in optimum, the individual’s marginal utility
of consumption is equal in the two states.
The indirect utility function U can now be written:
U(t;P;A)=( 1¡ ¼)u(c1(t;P;A);1) + ¼u(c2(t;P;A);t):
We have that U is strictly increasing in t, strictly decreasing in P,a n d
strictly increasing in A. Hence, we can de…ne an indi¤erence curve in (t;P)–
space going through (¹ t; ¹ P),c a l li tP(t;A;¹ t; ¹ P),b yU(t;P;A) being equal to
U(¹ t; ¹ P;A) if and only if P = P(t;A;¹ t; ¹ P). It follows that P(t;A;¹ t; ¹ P) is
increasing in both t and A.F u r t h e r m o r e ,



















where the second equality follows from the envelope theorem, and the fourth
equality is implied by eq. (2). This means that the willingness to pay for
treatment is equal to the willingness to pay for health plus the additional
income-earning capacity generated by treatment. Since, by construction,
P(t;A;¹ t; ¹ P) is the indi¤erence curve going through (¹ t; ¹ P), it follows that
@P(¹ t;A;¹ t; ¹ P)
@A
=0: (3)
Moreover, since ucc < 0, uch ¸ 0 and @c2=@A > 0, then eq. (3) implies that
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Hence, the slope of an indi¤erence curve through any point (¹ t; ¹ P) increases
with ability A. We will refer to this as the single-crossing property.T h e
single-crossing property is illustrated in Figure 1 for two di¤erent values of
ability, Al <A h,w h e r el and h denote low and high ability, respectively.
It remains to be shown that P(t;A;¹ t; ¹ P) is a strictly concave function of t,
so that an individual being faced with the possibility of purchasing treatment
t at cost P = tC constrained by t · 1, will have a unique level of treatment







00) are di¤erent combinations yielding the same utility level given
A, then any interior convex combination
(t;P)=( ®t
0 +( 1¡ ®)t
00;®P
0 +( 1¡ ®)P
00); 0 <®<1,
will yield a strictly higher utility level. Hence, assume that U(t0;P0;A)=
U(t00;P00;A)=U(¹ t; ¹ P;A), and introduce some notation:
c0
1 = c1(t0;P0;A) c00
1 = c1(t00;P00;A)
c0
2 = c2(t0;P0;A) c00
2 = c2(t00;P00;A):




2).S i n c e(c0
1;c 0
2) satis…es the
budget constraint given (t0;P0;A),a n d(c00
1;c 00
2) satis…es the budget constraint
given (t00;P00;A), it follows that (c1;c 2) satis…es the budget constraint given
(t;P;A), implying that (c1;c 2) is feasible. Hence,





2;t 0A)+( 1¡ ®)u(c00
2;t 00A)]
= ¼U(t0;P0;A)+( 1¡ ¼)U(t00;P00;A)=U(¹ t; ¹ P;A)
where the …rst inequality follows since (c1;c 2) is feasible, and the second
equality follows since u is strictly concave. This means that P(t;A;¹ t; ¹ P) is
a strictly concave function of t; we will refer to this property as diminishing
willingness to pay for treatment.
84M a i n r e s u l t
Due to the diminishing willingness to pay for treatment, an individual be-
ing faced with the possibility of purchasing treatment t at cost P = tC,
constrained by t · 1, will have a unique level of treatment t(A) maximiz-
ing U(t;tC;A). Furthermore, due to the single-crossing property, t(A) will





I.e., the marginal willingness to pay for treatment equals the marginal cost
of treatment. It follows that t(A) is a strictly increasing function of A when
0 < t(A) < 1.
We have that t(A)=1for all A ¸ A¤,w h e r eA¤ satis…es that the indi¤er-
ence curve through (1;C) has slope C, so that unconstrained maximization
of U(t;tC;A¤) leads to t =1 . By the single-crossing property, A¤ is unique.




Since @P(t;A;¹ t; ¹ P)=@t > A for all values of t, ¹ t,a n d ¹ P,w eh a v et h a tA¤ <C .
Moreover, it follows from eq. (2) that c1 = c2 = A ¡ ¼C when t =1and
P = C, implying that t =1is not feasible when A<¼ C . Finally, since
uc(c;h) !1as c # 0 whenever h>0, it follows that @P(1;A;1;C)=@t ! 0
as A # ¼C. This means that A¤ >¼ C . Note that the individual may choose
a level of treatment that enables her to fully recover (i.e., h2 = h1)e v e ni f
A<C , provided that A is greater than or equal to the insurance premium.
The individual’s optimal level of treatment is illustrated in Figure 2, for two
di¤erent values of ability: Al <A ¤ and Ah = A¤,w h e r el and h denotes low
and high ability, respectively.
These observations partially prove the proposition below, where we ap-
ply the following terminology: By full insurance, we mean that u(c1;h 1)=
u(c2;h 2), i.e.,t h a tu t i l i t yi sc o n s t a n ta c r o s st h et w os t a t e s . B ypartial in-
surance, we mean that u(c1;h 1) >u (c2;h 2), i.e., that utility is lower when
the individual is ill, even though she receives the insurance indemnity. The
proposition shows that the individual is fully insured if she chooses full treat-
ment, while only partly insured if she chooses partial treatment. Moreover,
9with full treatment, she will not receive any cash payment in addition to what
is required to pay for the treatment, while in the case of partial treatment,
her indemnity will exceed the amount used for medical treatment.
Proposition 1 There exists a level of ability, A¤,w h e r e¼C < A¤ <C,s u c h
that the following holds:
1. If the individual’s level of ability when healthy, A, is equal to or greater
than the critical value A¤ (i.e., A ¸ A¤), then her optimal level of
treatment is equal to one and does not vary with A: t(A)=1 . Her level
of consumption is the same in both states: c1(1;C;A)=c2(1;C;A)=
A ¡ ¼C. Utility is the same in both states: u(c1;h 1)=u(c2;h 2);t h u s ,
the individual is fully insured. Her insurance coverage is in the form of
medical treatment only.
2. If, however, the individual’s level of ability when healthy, A,i sl e s s
than the critical value A¤ (i.e., 0 <A<A ¤), then her optimal level of
treatment is positive and less than one, 0 < t(A) < 1, and increasing
with A: @t(A)=@A > 0: Her level of consumption if ill is lower than
if healthy: c2(t(A);t(A)C;A) < c1(t(A);t(A)C;A): Her utility if ill is
lower than if healthy: u(c2;h 2) <u (c1;h 1); thus, she is partly insured.
Her insurance coverage is partly in the form of medical treatment and
partly in the form of cash.
Proof. Part (1). Given the observations prior to the Proposition, it
remains to be shown that the individual is fully insured and has insurance
coverage in the form of medical treatment only. Full insurance follows since
c1 = c2 = A¡¼C and h1 = h2 =1 , implying that u(c1;h 1)=u(c2;h 2).S i n c e
cash payment equals c2 ¡ tA + A ¡ c1 (cf. footnote 5), it follows that cash
payment is zero.
Part (2). By the de…nition of A¤, 0 · t(A) < 1 whenever 0 <A<A ¤.
Moreover, since uh(c;h) !1as h # 0 whenever c>0,a n duc(c;h) !
1 or uh(c;h) !1as c # 0 and h # 0, it follows from A>0 and eq.
(2) that @P(t;A;t;tC)=@t > C if t is su¢ciently small; hence, t(A) > 0.
Now, the single-crossing property implies that dt(A)=dA > 0: From eq. (2)
and the properties of u, it follows that c1 >c 2,s i n c eh1 =1 ,a n dh2 =
t(A) < 1: This in turn means that u(c1;h 1) >u (c2;h 2), showing that the
individual is partly insured. To show that cash payment is positive, i.e.,
10that c2 ¡ tA + A ¡ c1 > 0, we start out with the condition that t(A) is
determined by @P(t(A);A;t(A);t(A)C)=@t = C whenever 0 < t(A) < 1.
Thus, when ill, the marginal willingness to pay for treatment equals the cost
of treatment: uh(c2;t)=uc(c2;t)+A = C. In the hypothetical case where
treatment were available also if healthy, or inversely, where health could be
sold at price C ¡ A, the access to actuarially fair insurance would imply
the same level of health in both states. Since this is not the case, it is a
binding constraint that health if healthy cannot be sold at price C ¡ A,
implying that marginal willingness to pay for health if healthy is less than
C ¡ A: uh(c1;1)=uc(c1;1) <C+ A = uh(c2;t)=uc(c2;t). Hence, e¤ectively,
the relative price of health in terms of consumption is lower if healthy than
if ill. Combining this …nding with the budget constraint and the assumption
(1), and recalling that ucc < 0 and uch ¸ 0,i m p l yt h a tc1 <A¡ ¼tC and
c2 >t A ¡¼tC. This in turn means that c1¡A<c 2¡tA,o rc2¡tA+A¡c1 > 0.
5A s p e c i a l c a s e
The following Cobb-Douglas function is a Bernoulli function that satis…es all
assumptions listed in Section 2:
u(c;h)=crhs,w i t h r>0;s > 0 and r + s<1.







uc(A¡¼C;1) + A = s
r(A ¡ ¼C)+A;
where the second equality follows since c2 = A¡¼C when t =1and P = C,









when u is given by the Cobb-Douglas function above. Since A¤ is de…ned by












Thus, A¤ is increasing in the probability of falling ill, ¼,a n di nt h ec o s to f
treatment, C.
6 Discussion
Our focus of attention has been on how an individual’s inherent ability at full
functionality (i.e., when healthy) in‡uences her ex ante choice of insurance
contract and her optimal level of coverage. Insurance allows the individual to
allocate income between the two states of the world prior to knowing which
state has occurred. Moreover, it enables her to achieve her optimal distri-
bution of income on consumption and health when ill. Since the individual
is assumed to have perfect foresight, her optimal allocation ex ante will be
optimal also ex post.
The novelty of this paper is the integration of what is usually thought to
be di¤erent types of insurance, namely insurance against the risk of incurring
medical expenditures and insurance against the risk of losing income due to
(permanently) reduced ability (or, productivity). We argue that a health
insurance should o¤er a hedge against both potential expenditures on medical
treatments and a potential loss in income due to reduced health. Contrary
to what is assumed in most of the health insurance literature, we allow the
individual to choose whether or not to restore health if ill. We focus on how
the individual’s ability at full functionality determines to what extent she
choose to restore health if she falls ill. We show that if the individual’s level
of ability is su¢ciently low, then she chooses to restore health only partly,
thus su¤ering a loss in ability. Moreover, in order to obtain the preferred
level of consumption when ill, she holds a contract that entitles her to a
cash transfer in the event of illness. Consequently, a low-ability individual
chooses a contract that ensures her some cash payment and some medical
treatment.6 If, on the other hand, the individual has a su¢ciently high
level of ability when healthy, then she will hold a contract that provides for
6It is assumed that ability if ill is zero without any treatment. If we allow this ability
level to be positive, then an individual with low ability when healthy may choose not to
receive treatment at all.
12complete medical treatment and thus full restoration of health. It should be
noted that, whether the actual compensation is in the form of a cash transfer
that covers the actual costs of treatment, or is directly in the form of medical
treatment, is of no importance. The individual’s ex-ante decision to restore
health is una¤ected by the way she is compensated; the fundamental decision
is whether to restore health or not.7
Our …ndings are driven by the fact that the potential loss in income, i.e.,
ability, is larger, the higher is the ability at full functionality. This implies
that the ‘net-price’ of the two types of contracts di¤ers depending on the
individual’s ability. The higher the potential income loss due to reduced
ability (i.e., health), the relatively cheaper is the contract o¤ering indemnity
in kind (i.e., treatment), compared to a contract o¤ering cash compensation
of income loss. Thus, the cost-bene…t ratio on medical treatment is lower the
higher the level of ability at full functionality.
The preceding analysis is based on a highly stylized model. We largely
disregard any informational constraints causing the familiar problems of ad-
verse selection and moral hazard. Furthermore, the individual is assumed to
ex ante be fully informed about health consequences of illnesses as well as
about treatment options (i.e., consumer sovereignty). The insurers need not,
however, know the individual’s ability at full functionality, since it turns out
that, even without such knowledge, …rst-best, zero-pro…t insurance contracts
lead in an undistorted way to self-selection. Transaction costs associated
with gathering of information about relevant treatment options and treat-
ment costs for all types of diseases are ignored. Moreover, we make a some-
what strong assumption regarding the treatment technology: the individual
recovers instantly and proportionally to the level of treatment received, and
treatment is e¤ective with respect to health. However, taking these lim-
itations into account, we still think our model provides rather interesting
…ndings which may be subject to further studies.
7Arrow (1963) mentions three di¤erent ways in which costs of medical care can be
covered in an insurance contract: payment directly in medical services, a …xed cash pay-
ment, and a cash payment that covers the actual costs involved in providing the necessary
medical treatment. In a perfect market, individuals wishing to receive medical treatment
would be indi¤erent between a payment directly in the form of medical treatment and its
cash equivalent.
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Figure 1. The single-crossing property.
Figure 2. The optimal level of treatment.
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